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Our goal is to integrate philosophical and empirical work on constraints on normative relativism. First, we present a working definition of moral relativism. Second, we outline naturalist versions of normative relativism, and third, we highlight the empirical constraints in this reasoning.
Meta-ethics: addresses questions about first-order (normative) ethical judgments, e.g., about the nature of morality; the meaning of moral talk; whether morality is absolute or relative; whether moral judgments can be true or false (objective) or merely subjective, how we can have knowledge of moral truth. 2.
Mar 10, 2021 · Smith argues that absolutists and relativists will differ on questions regarding the rationality or reasonableness of human behaviour and that these questions cannot be settled by taking a stance on Naturalism or Non-Naturalism in ethics.
Meta-Ethical Moral Relativism: There are no objective moral facts or properties, but moral facts and properties do exist in such a way as to depend on certain contextual parameters related to the individuals or groups forming moral judgments.
Experiment 1 showed that individuals tend to regard ethical statements as clearly more objec-tive than social conventions and tastes, and almost as objective as scientific facts. Yet, there was considerable variation in objectivism, both across different ethical statements, and across individuals.
By examining the relationships between dif erent metaethical commitments, we can better understand the extent to which such commitments are (or are not) systematic and coherent, shedding light on the psychological complexity of an important area of moral belief and experience.
Sep 11, 2015 · It is customary to distinguish between descriptive or empirical, prescriptive or normative, and meta-ethical versions of moral relativism. These views in turn are motivated by a number of empirical and philosophical considerations similar to those introduced in defense of cultural relativism.
