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- Recognizing that some level of competition with Russia is inevitable, RAND researchers conducted a qualitative assessment of “cost-imposing options” that could unbalance and overextend Russia. Such cost-imposing options could place new burdens on Russia, ideally heavier burdens than would be imposed on the United States for pursuing those options.
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Apr 24, 2019 · As the U.S. National Defense Strategy recognizes the United States is currently locked in a great-power competition with Russia. This report analyzes how the United States can compete to its own advantage and capitalize on Russia's weaknesses.
- Propaganda Model
Russia's propaganda model is high-volume and multichannel,...
- Research Brief
A team of RAND experts developed economic, geopolitical,...
- Propaganda Model
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- Economic Cost-Imposing Measures
- Geopolitical Cost-Imposing Measures
- Ideological and Informational Cost-Imposing Measures
- Air and Space Cost-Imposing Measures
- Maritime Cost-Imposing Measures
- Land and Multidomain Cost-Imposing Measures
- Implications For The Army
- Conclusions
Expanding U.S. energy productionwould stress Russia’s economy, potentially constraining its government budget and, by extension, its defense spending. By adopting policies that expand world supply and depress global prices, the United States can limit Russian revenue. Doing so entails little cost or risk, produces second-order benefits for the U.S....
Providing lethal aid to Ukrainewould exploit Russia’s greatest point of external vulnerability. But any increase in U.S. military arms and advice to Ukraine would need to be carefully calibrated to increase the costs to Russia of sustaining its existing commitment without provoking a much wider conflict in which Russia, by reason of proximity, woul...
Diminishing faith in the Russian electoral systemwould be difficult because of state control over most media sources. Doing so could increase discontent with the regime, but there are serious risks that the Kremlin could increase repression or lash out and pursue a diversionary conflict abroad that might run counter to Western interests. Creating t...
Reposturing bombers within easy striking rangeof key Russian strategic targets has a high likelihood of success and would certainly get Moscow’s attention and raise Russian anxieties; the costs and risks of this option are low as long as the bombers are based out of range of most of Russia’s theater ballistic and ground-based cruise missiles. Repos...
Increasing U.S. and allied naval force posture and presencein Russia’s operating areas could force Russia to increase its naval investments, diverting investments from potentially more dangerous areas. But the size of investment required to reconstitute a true blue-water naval capability makes it unlikely that Russia could be compelled or enticed t...
Increasing U.S. forces in Europe, increasing European NATO member ground capabilities, and deploying a large number of NATO forces on the Russian borderwould likely have only limited effects on extending Russia. All the options would enhance deterrence, but the risks vary. A general increase in NATO ground force capabilities in Europe—including clo...
The task of “extending Russia” need not fall primarily on the Army or even the U.S. armed forces as a whole. Indeed, the most promising ways to extend Russia—those with the highest benefit, the lowest risk, and greatest likelihood of success—likely fall outside the military domain. Russia is not seeking military parity with the United States and, t...
The most-promising options to “extend Russia” are those that directly address its vulnerabilities, anxieties, and strengths, exploiting areas of weakness while undermining Russia’s current advantages. In that regard, Russia’s greatest vulnerability, in any competition with the United States, is its economy, which is comparatively small and highly d...
- James Dobbins, Raphael S. Cohen, Nathan Chandler, Bryan Frederick, Edward Geist, Paul DeLuca, Forres...
- Ebook
- 2019
Feb 22, 2024 · Courtney Russia’s war on Ukraine has strained the “no-limits” partnership to which Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin agreed in February 2022, just weeks prior to Russia’s full-scale ...
This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of the RAND Corporation research project Extending Russia Competing from Advantageous Ground, sponsored by the Army Quadrennial Defense Review Office, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff G-8, Headquarters, Department of the Army.
- James Dobbins, Raphael S. Cohen, Nathan Chandler, Bryan Frederick, Edward Geist, Paul DeLuca, Forres...
- 2019
Jan 1, 2019 · This paper looks at a series of analytical reports published in 2015– 2020 by the RAND Corporation focused on Russia, its armed forces and the policies pursued by Moscow on the territory of...
Jun 15, 2019 · It examines Russian vulnerabilities and anxieties; analyzes potential policy options to exploit them; and assesses the associated benefits, costs, and risks, as well as the likelihood of successful implementation.
- Raphael Cohen, Nathan Chandler, Bryan Frederick
Apr 11, 2019 · It examines Russian vulnerabilities and anxieties; analyzes potential policy options to exploit them; and assesses the associated benefits, costs, and risks, as well as the likelihood of...
