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The term ‘moral relativism’ is associated with a variety of very different concepts, some of which function mainly to oppose the view. Schematically, we intend to use the term as follows: Moral relativism consists of three components. First, it holds that descriptive, prescriptive, or meta-ethical aspects of prescriptive
Meta-Ethical Moral Relativism: There are no objective moral facts or properties, but moral facts and properties do exist in such a way as to depend on certain contextual parameters related to the individuals or groups forming moral judgments.
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Meta-ethics: addresses questions about first-order (normative) ethical judgments, e.g., about the nature of morality; the meaning of moral talk; whether morality is absolute or relative; whether moral judgments can be true or false (objective) or merely subjective, how we can have knowledge of moral truth. 2. The Problem of Moral Relativism.
Moreover, psychological research that has specifically focused on meta-ethics, has not addressed questions concerning ethical objectivism. Instead, it has focused on the distinction between ethical universalism and ethical relativism – i.e., whether individ-uals treat their ethical beliefs as applying to all people, and all cultures (Nichols &
Discusses three forms of moral relativism—normative moral relativism, moral judgement relativism, and meta‐ethical relativism. After discussing objections to each view, it is shown that the objections can all be met and that all three versions of moral relativism are correct.
Jan 9, 2012 · [1] Though the issues employed were the same as those found in Goodwin and Darley (Citation 2008), the wording of some of the issue statements was slightly changed.In particular, all of the ethical statements utilized by Goodwin and Darley contained the word “morally”—e.g., “anonymously donating a significant proportion of one's income to charity is a morally good action.”
At the heart of meta-ethics is the debate about whether or not people’s moral claims assume the existence of moral facts—and if they do, whether or not those facts are non-relative and/or mind-independent. Often underlying this debate is the assumption that moral discourse is relatively uniform.
