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  2. Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762—1814) Johann Gottlieb Fichte is one of the major figures in German philosophy in the period between Kant and Hegel. Initially considered one of Kant’s most talented followers, Fichte developed his own system of transcendental philosophy, the so-called Wissenschaftslehre. Through technical philosophical works and ...

  3. Continental philosophy - Fichte, Idealism, German: One such successor was the German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814). Taking Kant’s second critique as his starting point, Fichte declared that all being is posited by the ego, which posits itself. As Fichte states in The Science of Ethics as Based on the Science of Knowledge ...

  4. May 29, 2018 · Johann Gottlieb Fichte is best known for his lifelong effort to develop a comprehensive system of transcendental idealism under the general name Wissenschaftslehre or "Theory of Scientific Knowledge," which would be true to the "spirit" if not to the letter of Kantianism.

  5. If we study Fichtes philosophy on its own terms, however, we can correct this caricature. As Fichte understands it, the Wissenschaftslehre carries out the philosophical implications of Kantianism. Critics of Fichte often mistake his transcendental inquiry as a series of metaphysical claims.

  6. Kantianism. Critics of Fichte often mistake his transcendental inquiry as a series of metaphysical claims. Thus they assume that realism is correct, and they see Fichte as reducing the world itself, rather than the world as repre-sentation, to consciousness. However, if we position the Wissenschaftslehre in

  7. May 19, 2018 · On May 19, 1762, German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte was born. Fichte was one of the founding figures of the philosophical movement known as German idealism , which developed from the theoretical and ethical writings of Immanuel Kant .

  8. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel radicalized this view, transforming Kant’s transcendental idealism into absolute idealism, which holds that things in themselves are a contradiction in terms, because a thing must be an object of our consciousness if it is to be an object at all.