Search results
Mar 3, 2015 · The Council includes distinguished scholars, writers, researchers, and scientists. “Insights” will feature some of the work of this highly-accomplished group of thinkers. Dan Turello leads off the series by interviewing philosopher John R. Searle. Searle is the Slusser Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley.
- Overview
- Philosophy of mind of John Searle
- Intentionality and consciousness
- The Chinese room argument
- Mind and body
In large part, Searle was driven to the study of mind by his study of language. As indicated above, his analysis of speech acts always involved reference to mental concepts. Since mental states are essentially involved in issuing speech acts, Searle realized that his analysis of language could not be complete unless it included a clear understandin...
In large part, Searle was driven to the study of mind by his study of language. As indicated above, his analysis of speech acts always involved reference to mental concepts. Since mental states are essentially involved in issuing speech acts, Searle realized that his analysis of language could not be complete unless it included a clear understandin...
An important feature of the majority of mental states is that they have an “intentional” structure: they are intrinsically about, or directed toward, something. (Intentionality in this sense is distinct from the ordinary quality of being intended, as when one intends to do something.) Thus, believing is necessarily believing that something is the case; desiring is necessarily desiring something; intending is necessarily intending to do something. Not all mental states are intentional, however: pain, for example, is not, and neither are many states of anxiety, elation, and depression.
Speech acts are intentional in a derivative sense, insofar as they are expressive of intrinsically intentional mental states, including expressed psychological states and propositional contents. According to Searle, the derived intentionality of language accounts for the apparently mysterious capacity of words, phrases, and sentences to refer not only to things in the world but also to things that are purely imaginary or fictional.
In a now classic paper published in 1980, “Minds, Brains, and Programs,” Searle developed a provocative argument to show that artificial intelligence is indeed artificial. Imagine that a person who knows nothing of the Chinese language is sitting alone in a room. In that room are several boxes containing cards on which Chinese characters of varying complexity are printed, as well as a manual that matches strings of Chinese characters with strings that constitute appropriate responses. On one side of the room is a slot through which speakers of Chinese may insert questions or other messages in Chinese, and on the other is a slot through which the person in the room may issue replies. The person in the room, using the manual, acts as a kind of computer program, transforming one string of symbols introduced as “input” into another string of symbols issued as “output.” Searle claims that even if the person in the room is a good processor of messages, so that his responses always make perfect sense to Chinese speakers, he still does not understand the meanings of the characters he is manipulating. Thus, contrary to strong AI, real understanding cannot be a matter of mere symbol manipulation. Like the person in the room, computers simulate intelligence but do not exhibit it.
The Chinese room argument has generated an enormous critical literature. According to the “systems response,” the occupant of the room is analogous not to a computer but only to a computer’s central processing unit (CPU). He does not understand Chinese because he is only one part of the computer that responds appropriately to Chinese messages. What does understand Chinese is the system as a whole, including the manual, any instructions for using it, and any intermediate means of symbol manipulation. Searle’s reply is that the other parts of the system can be dispensed with. Suppose the person in the room simply memorizes the characters, the manual, and the instructions so that he can respond to Chinese messages entirely on his own. He still would not know what the Chinese characters mean.
Searle’s view that mental states are inherently biological implies that the perennial mind-body problem—the problem of explaining how it is possible for minds and bodies to interact—is fundamentally misconceived. Minds and bodies are not radically different kinds of substance, as the 17th-century French philosopher René Descartes maintained, and mi...
- Nicholas Fotion
Philosopher John Searle lays out the case for studying human consciousness -- and systematically shoots down some of the common objections to taking it seriously. As we learn more about the brain processes that cause awareness, accepting that consciousness is a biological phenomenon is an important first step. And no, he says, consciousness is not a massive computer simulation.
John Searle at IMDb; John Searle on mind, matter, consciousness and his theory of perception; Conversations with Searle; Interview in Conversations with History Archived October 12, 2009, at the Wayback Machine series. Available in webcast and podcast. Video or transcript of an interview with John Searle on language, writing, mind, and ...
- John R. Searle
- 1983
Jun 23, 2005 · John R. Searle replies: Stevan Harnad’s letter raises a challenge to the very possibility of any scientific account of consciousness of the sort that both Koch and I favor. He says, “We do not know how brain activity could generate feeling. Even less do we know why.” And he laments the “powerlessness of the usual kind of causal how/why ...
May 23, 2013 · John Searle one of the world's great philosophers of mind and language, has spent fifty years stimulating thinking around the world. What he says about consc...
- 16 min
- 472.8K
- TEDx Talks
People also ask
Does John Searle recognize consciousness?
What is Searle's view on consciousness?
Is consciousness a biological phenomenon?
What does Husserl say about consciousness?
Jun 22, 2002 · Though Block’s proposed threefold distinction has proven influential, some would balk at proceeding on its basis. John Searle, for example, would recognize phenomenal consciousness, but deny Block’s other two candidates are proper senses of “conscious” at all (Searle 1992). The dispute here may seem no more than terminological.
