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Meta-ethical moral relativism holds that in such disagreements, nobody is objectively right or wrong. [1] . Normative moral relativism holds that because nobody is right or wrong, everyone ought to tolerate the behavior of others even when large disagreements about morality exist. [2] .
Philosophical relativism, in contrast, asserts that the truth of a proposition depends on the metaphysical, or theoretical frame, or the instrumental method, or the context in which the proposition is expressed, or on the person, groups, or culture who interpret the proposition. [8]
Jan 23, 2007 · Metaethics. First published Tue Jan 23, 2007; substantive revision Tue Jan 24, 2023. Metaethics is the attempt to understand the metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and psychological, presuppositions and commitments of moral thought, talk, and practice.
- Metaethics: Introduction. The prefix “meta” is derived from the Greek for “beyond”. Metaethics is therefore a form of study that is beyond the topics considered in normative or applied ethics.
- The Value of Metaethics. A former colleague once suggested that Metaethics was entirely and frustratingly pointless — academia for academia’s sake, she thought.
- Cognitivism versus Non-Cognitivism. Key to the successful study of Metaethics is understanding the various key terminological distinctions that make up the “metaethical map”.
- Realism versus Anti-Realism. The second key fork in the road that separates metaethical theories is the choice between Moral Realism and Moral Anti-Realism (as with Cognitivism, the “Moral” prefix is assumed from hereon).
Mar 1, 2008 · Instead, it has focused on the distinction between ethical universalism and ethical relativism – i.e., whether individuals treat their ethical beliefs as applying to all people, and all cultures (Nichols & Folds-Bennett, 2003).
First, it holds that descriptive, prescriptive, or meta-ethical aspects of prescriptive terms such as ‘right,’ ‘wrong,’ ‘ought,’ etc., (e.g., their use, legitimacy, or meaning) are relative to a moral view.
