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Chalmers characterizes his view as "naturalistic dualism": naturalistic because he believes mental states supervene "naturally" on physical systems (such as brains); dualist because he believes mental states are ontologically distinct from and not reducible to physical systems.
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Nov 2, 2019 · Chalmers characterizes his view as naturalistic dualism: naturalistic because he believes mental states are caused by physical systems (such as brains); dualist because he believes mental states are ontologically distinct from and not reducible to physical systems.
Chalmers isn’t suggesting philosophical zombies actually exist; rather, he’s highlighting the limits of physicalist explanations of mind. This argument steers us towards considering dualist or panpsychist views, which posit that consciousness has a fundamental place in the fabric of reality, distinct from the physical laws we know.
His version of dualism is quite physicalist, perhaps unlike other more familiar versions. Since he wants a physicalist explanation, one maybe a little empirical unlike most dualist theories, he seeks to attribute all phenomena - in this case, that of experience - to the physical. This answers your question:
Aug 19, 2003 · In general, the idea is that, for some particular domain, there are two fundamental kinds or categories of things or principles. In theology, for example a ‘dualist’ is someone who believes that Good and Evil – or God and the Devil – are independent and more or less equal forces in the world.
David J. Chalmers. When I was in graduate school, I recall hearing “One starts as a materialist, then one becomes a dualist, then a panpsychist, and one ends up as an idealist”.1 I don’t know where this comes from, but I think the idea was something like this.
28. Naturalistic Dualism. DAVID CHALMERS. Nonreductive Explanation. Th ere are principled reasons to think that no reductive explanation of consciousness, in terms of underlying physical processes, is possible.
