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Jan 23, 2004 · Perhaps hardest to characterize as a species of non-cognitivism are the claims of several recent theorists who suggest that non-cognitivism is best understood as a metasemantic theory.
- Embedding Problem Response Strategies
The resulting position will be a version of non-cognitivism...
- Charles Leslie Stevenson
Charles Leslie Stevenson (1908–1979) was an American...
- Hume's Moral Philosophy
Hume’s position in ethics, which is based on his empiricist...
- Moral Skepticism
Such views are often described as non-cognitivism. That...
- Naturalism: Moral
But it’s not clear if this draws the line between naturalism...
- Metaethics
Cognitivists and non-cognitivists face a common challenge:...
- Embedding Problem Response Strategies
Thus, it is a prerequisite for understanding and evaluating metaethical theories that you understand these two debates. In this section, we deal with the debate between cognitivists and non-cognitivists.
- The Challenge for Non-cognitivism. According to a simple form of non-cognitivism, to make a moral judgement is to express a desire (a non-cognitive attitude) rather than a belief (a cognitive attitude).
- Ecumenical Non-cognitivism. It has recently become popular to argue that ecumenical non-cognitivism is the version of non-cognitivism that is best equipped to meet the challenge of moral uncertainty and thus to accommodate both certitude and importance.
- Lenman’s Version of Ecumenical Expressivism. Lenman’s response to the challenge starts with the proposal that the non-cognitivist can give the following story about moral uncertainty: when a subject, S, wonders whether φ-ing is wrong, S wonders whether an improved version of S would disapprove of φ-ing.
- Ridge’s Version of Ecumenical Expressivism. Ridge’s favoured version of ecumenical expressivism has several affinities with the account suggested by Lenman.
- Metaethics: Introduction. The prefix “meta” is derived from the Greek for “beyond”. Metaethics is therefore a form of study that is beyond the topics considered in normative or applied ethics.
- The Value of Metaethics. A former colleague once suggested that Metaethics was entirely and frustratingly pointless — academia for academia’s sake, she thought.
- Cognitivism versus Non-Cognitivism. Key to the successful study of Metaethics is understanding the various key terminological distinctions that make up the “metaethical map”.
- Realism versus Anti-Realism. The second key fork in the road that separates metaethical theories is the choice between Moral Realism and Moral Anti-Realism (as with Cognitivism, the “Moral” prefix is assumed from hereon).
Much contemporary metaethical debate between cognitivists and non-cognitivists thus concerns the extent to which beliefs alone, desires alone, or some compound of the two—what J.E.J. Altham (1986) has dubbed “besires”—are capable of capturing the prescriptive and affective dimension that moral discourse seems to evidence (see Theories ...
Sep 10, 2020 · In this chapter, we show that moral uncertainty creates a challenge for another metaethical view, namely non-cognitivism, according to which moral judgements are desires, or some other...
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