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Gettier problem. The Gettier problem, in the field of epistemology, is a landmark philosophical problem concerning the understanding of descriptive knowledge. Attributed to American philosopher Edmund Gettier, Gettier-type counterexamples (called "Gettier-cases") challenge the long-held justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge.
Jun 22, 2011 · In Justification Logic constants are used to represent justifications of assumptions in situations where they are not analyzed any further. Suppose it is desired to postulate that an axiom \ (A\) is justified for the knower. One simply postulates \ (e_ {1} : A\) for some evidence constant \ (e_ {1}\) (with index 1).
Feb 21, 2000 · Foundationalism is a view about the structure of (epistemic) justification or knowledge. The foundationalist’s thesis in short is that (a) there are some “basic” or “foundational” beliefs that have a positive epistemic status—e.g., they count as justified or as knowledge—without depending on any other beliefs for this status, and (b) any other beliefs with a positive epistemic ...
If a belief is caused in the right way (by a reliable belief-forming processes), then it is justified. One virtue of this approach is that it accounts for the intuition that someone could have a justified belief without being able to cite all the reasons for holding that belief. However, this view is not without fault.
Oct 28, 2012 · Richard Foley, When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press, 2012, 153pp., $35.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780691154725.
It is important here not to be misled by adjectives that indicate a positive evaluation of belief, like ‘justified’ and ‘reliable’ (or ‘reliably formed’). One might easily think that being justified is a good thing, hence that a justified true belief is better than a mere true belief—a quick “solution” to the value problem.
Sep 6, 2020 · According to Independence thinkers, the justification of a belief is distinct from its rationality. ‘Rational’ picks out a different quality of a belief than does ‘justified’. As Alvin Goldman (1986, p. 60) says, ‘since ‘‘rational’’ and ‘‘justified’’ are different terms of appraisal, rules of rationality might well be ...
