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Josiah Harmar (November 10, 1753 – August 20, 1813) was an officer in the United States Army during the American Revolutionary War and the Northwest Indian War. He was the senior officer in the Army for six years and seven months (August 1784 to March 1791).
The Harmar campaign was an attempt by the United States Army to subdue confederated Native Americans nations in the Northwest Territory that were seen as hostile in Autumn 1790. The campaign was led by General Josiah Harmar and is considered a significant campaign of the Northwest Indian War.
- 7-22 October 1790
- Northwestern Confederacy victory
Lieutenant Colonel Commandant Josiah Harmar. Josiah Harmar was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on 10 November 1753. When he was 18, he was appointed a captain in the 1st Pennsylvania Battalion. In October 1776, he entered the Continental Army as a captain in the 3d Pennsylvania Regiment.
Josiah Harmar was a Continental Army officer and the senior officer of the United States Army from 1784 to 1791. He served in the Revolutionary War, the Northwest Indian War, and the mercantile business in Philadelphia. See his miniature by Raphael Peale, a painter of miniatures and still life.
Nov 11, 2022 · The Josiah Harmar papers contain the official and personal correspondence, military records, and diaries of Harmar, with particular focus on his military leadership during the Northwest Indian War. Extent: 14 linear feet. Language: English. Authors: Collection processed and finding aid created by Shannon Wait, April 2011. Background.
HARMAR, JOSIAH. (1753–1813). Continental officer, lieutenant colonel, commandant of the U.S. army, 1784–1791. Pennsylvania. Born in Philadelphia on 10 November 1753, Josiah Harmar was orphaned three months later. He was educated at Robert Proud's Quaker school.
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A master's thesis by MAJ (P) Edwin D. Matthaidess III that evaluates the US Army's failure in the Northwest Indian War. It argues that Brigadier General Josiah Harmar's campaign plan failed to recognize the strategic context and the limitations of American capabilities.
