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One that could not have been otherwise
- A necessary truth is one that could not have been otherwise. It would have been true under all circumstances. A contingent truth is one that is true, but could have been false. A necessary truth is one that must be true; a contingent truth is one that is true as it happens, or as things are, but that did not have to be true.
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4 days ago · A contingent truth is one that is true, but could have been false. A necessary truth is one that must be true; a contingent truth is one that is true as it happens, or as things are, but that did not have to be true. In Leibniz's phrase, a necessary truth is true in all possible worlds.
Broadly speaking, a logical truth is a statement which is true regardless of the truth or falsity of its constituent propositions. In other words, a logical truth is a statement which is not only true, but one which is true under all interpretations of its logical components (other than its logical constants ).
May 21, 2015 · A necessary truth is a true statement whose negation must imply a contradiction in reality, such that the negation would be impossible. So, if “One plus one equals two,” is a necessary truth, then the statement “One plus one does not equal two” will imply a contradiction.
On the one hand, a necessary truth is defined as a proposition the opposite of which implies a contradiction, while correspondingly a contingent truth is defined as a true proposition that is not necessary.
Feb 24, 2019 · Updated on February 24, 2019. The distinction between contingent and necessary statements is one of the oldest in philosophy. Truth is necessary if denying it would entail a contradiction. A truth is contingent, however, if it happens to be true but could have been false. Example. Cats are mammals. Cats are reptiles. Cats have claws.
May 30, 2006 · A nowadays very common, but (apparently) late view in the history of philosophy, is that the necessity of a logical truth does not merely imply that some generalization about actual items holds, but also implies that the truth would have been true at a whole range of counterfactual circumstances.
(1) is true but (2) is false. It is a necessary truth that if I know you are sitting down, then you are sitting down; but if I know you are sitting down it is not a necessary truth that you are sitting down; you may get up at any moment. Plato and Aristotle, over and over again, seem to regard (2) as indistinguishable from (1).
