Search results
- Metaethical Moral Relativism (MMR). The truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons.
plato.stanford.edu › entries › moral-relativism
People also ask
What is meta-ethical relativism?
Do moral relativists support meta-ethical relativism?
Is moral objectivism a form of metaethical relativism?
Why do metaethical Relativists argue that moral judgments lack moral authority?
Feb 19, 2004 · The first point is a form of metaethical relativism: It says one morality may be true for one society and a conflicting morality may be true for another society. Hence, there is no one objectively correct morality for all societies. The second point, however, is a concession to moral objectivism.
- Author and Citation Info
We would like to show you a description here but the site...
- Relativism
It is customary to distinguish between descriptive or...
- Metaethics
Metaethics. First published Tue Jan 23, 2007; substantive...
- Author and Citation Info
Realism asserts that ethical values have some basis in reality and that reasoning about ethical matters requires an objective framework or foundation to discover what is truly good. For a realist, values are not simply subjective opinions.
Metaethics is a branch of analytic philosophy that explores the status, foundations, and scope of moral values, properties, and words. Whereas the fields of applied ethics and normative theory focus on what is moral, metaethics focuses on what morality itself is.
In metaphilosophy and ethics, metaethics is the study of the nature, scope, and meaning of moral judgment. It is one of the three branches of ethics generally studied by philosophers, the others being normative ethics (questions of how one ought to be and act) and applied ethics (practical questions of right behavior in given, usually ...
Meta-ethical relativism holds that moral judgments are not true or false in any absolute sense, but only relative to particular standpoints. This idea is essential to just about any version of moral relativism.