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Aug 4, 2023 · Function of Moral Sensitivity. Coined in 1979 by John McDowell, the term moral sensitivity commonly denotes the ability of a person to notice an ethical issue or problem, i.e., when actions or situations threaten others’ welfare, could violate ethical standards or values (Katsarov 2021 ). As an ability, moral sensitivity is distinct from a ...
- Johannes Katsarov
- johannes.katsarov@leuphana.de
Jan 21, 2021 · As we shall see, Kant observes in Groundwork III that moral motivation requires a ‘causality of reason to determine sensibility in conformity with its principles’, one in which reason ‘infuses’ a feeling of pleasure in the fulfillment of duty (G 4:460). Yet he claims that this goes beyond sense experience and so falls outside the scope ...
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It explains some of Kant's views about respect for the moral law and its role in moral motivation, and this leads to a consideration of the sensible motives that respect for the law limits, as well as the more general question of how Kant thinks that inclinations affect choice.
Feb 4, 2003 · (a) No moral facts exist to be known, since moral disagreements exemplify merely clashes in moral sensibility rather than differences about matters of fact. (b) Moral knowledge exists, but moral facts are relative to the social group in which moral sensibility is formed with the result that no moral truths are known to hold universally.
Oct 16, 2019 · Moral Responsibility. Making judgments about whether a person is morally responsible for her behavior, and holding others and ourselves responsible for actions and the consequences of actions, is a fundamental and familiar part of our moral practices and our interpersonal relationships.
Mar 25, 2011 · First, given Kant's ‘incorporation thesis’ – which states that the only sensible states capable of determining our actions are those that we willingly introduce and integrate into our maxims – it would seem that the content of our inclinations is morally irrelevant. Second, the exclusivity between the passivity that is characteristic of ...
In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant can claim that ‘our weal and woe are very important in the estimation of our practical reason; and, as far as our nature as sensible beings is concerned, our happiness is the only thing of importance’ (p. 61). 33. See Groundwork, p. 398 and Metaphysics of Morals, p. 457. 34.
