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- Habituation is not the emergence of innate virtue nor the transfer of virtue from what has it, to what doesn’t. Rather, habituation is self-transformation, the acquisition of a disposition—such as the disposition to act virtuously—by way of exercising that very disposition—acting virtuously.
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Central to Aristotelian ethics is the process of habituation by which agents acquire virtue. Aristotle holds that we become virtuous by performing virtuous actions—but he also holds that in order to perform virtuous actions, one must be virtuous.
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- Habit
- The Mean
- Noble
- References and Further Reading
In many discussions, the word “habit” is attached to the Ethics as though it were the answer to a multiple-choice question on a philosophy achievement test. Hobbes‘ Leviathan? Self-preservation. Descartes‘ Meditations? Mind-body problem. Aristotle’s Ethics? Habit. A faculty seminar I attended a few years ago was mired in the opinion that Aristotle ...
Now this discussion has shown that habit does make all the difference to our lives without being the only thing shaping those lives and without being the final form they take. The same discussion also points to a way to make some sense of one of the things that has always puzzled me most in the Ethics, the insistence that moral virtue is always in ...
Aristotle says plainly and repeatedly what it is that moral virtue is for the sake of, but the translators are afraid to give it to you straight. Most of them say it is the noble. One of them says it is the fine. If these answers went past you without even registering, that is probably because they make so little sense. To us, the word “noble” prob...
Aristotle, Metaphysics, Joe Sachs (trans.), Green Lion Press, 1999.Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Joe Sachs (trans.), Focus Philosophical Library, Pullins Press, 2002.Aristotle, On the Soul, Joe Sachs (trans.), Green Lion Press, 2001.Aristotle, Poetics, Joe Sachs (trans.), Focus Philosophical Library, Pullins Press, 2006.May 1, 2001 · Aristotle describes ethical virtue as a “ hexis ” (“state” “condition” “disposition”)—a tendency or disposition, induced by our habits, to have appropriate feelings (1105b25–6). Defective states of character are hexeis (plural of hexis) as well, but they are tendencies to have inappropriate feelings.
First, the notion of character formation (to use the broadest possible term for the phenomenon of habituation) in Aristotle is significantly more complicated than the notion that through habituation one develops good habits which are what we mean by ethical virtue.
This article discusses Aristotle's views on becoming good, focusing on habituation, reflection, and perception, and also examines virtues of character and virtues of thought, Socratic intellectualism, cleverness, the stages of ethical development, and mid-level goals.
This paper is concerned with Aristotle's theory of habituation, focusing on the following three issues: (1) the relation between habit and reason, (2) human nature and habituation, and (3) the roles of family and politics in habituation.
We become virtuous by acting as if we are virtuous. This central insight of Aristotle is explored in this lecture. Professor Gendler begins by explaining how Aristotle’s method can allow us to turn normative laws–which describe how we should act–into descriptive laws–which describe how we do act.
