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- Plato rejected the traditional theory of justice, which holds that people should do what is proper or “do good to friends and harm enemies.” He believed that justice is good for all people, including both the giver and the receiver, and that it should not be used as a means of benefiting some while harming others.
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Mar 8, 2002 · Plato in the Republic treats justice as an overarching virtue of both individuals and societies, so that almost every issue he (or we) would regard as ethical comes in under the notion of justice.
Jul 15, 2023 · That is why Plato’s theory of justice is not regarded as legal or judicial, nor is it related to the realms of “rights” and “duties.” It does not come within the limits of law: it is, as such, related to “social ethics.” Characteristics of Plato’s Theory of Justice. Justice is another name for righteousness.
Jun 26, 2017 · 1. Justice: Mapping the Concept. 1.1 Justice and Individual Claims. 1.2 Justice, Charity and Enforceable Obligation. 1.3 Justice and Impartiality. 1.4 Justice and Agency. 2. Justice: Four Distinctions. 2.1 Conservative versus Ideal Justice. 2.2 Corrective versus Distributive Justice. 2.3 Procedural versus Substantive Justice.
Plato's defense of justice falls into two parts. First he gives an account of the nature of justice. Then he argues that, given this account, a person will be better off just than unjust. Plato's account of the nature of justice is well-known. He begins with justice in the stale, dividing the state into three classes, each one having its
Glaucon gives a speech defending injustice: (i) justice originates as a compromise between weak people who are afraid that suffering injustice is worse than doing it (358e-359a); (ii) people act justly because this is necessary and unavoidable, so justice is good only for its consequences (story of the ring of Gyges’ ancestor, 359c-360d ...
There is one fundamental argument in the Republic for the conclusion that justice is the greatest good. It begins in Book II; although adumbrated in Book IV, it is not completed until Book IX; and it draws essentially on material in Books VI and VII about Platonic forms, knowledge, and philosophical training.
