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Jan 20, 2023 · This entry has sought to substantiate the general ideas behind retributive justice by looking at some of the contemporary theories and debates surrounding the following three general issues: (a) why culpable wrongdoers deserve to be punished, (b) the relationship between deserved punishment and justice, and (c) the nature of retributive ...
Dec 2, 2021 · Restorative justice differs from retribution by combining these elements with a forward-looking approach that aims to transform offenders and thereby prevent future offences through their admission of their wrongdoing and their willingness to take responsibility for it.
Most philosophers agree that legal punishment has five components: it is the (1) intentional infliction of (2) a harm (3) by a legitimate authority, (4) on someone the authority believes has broken the law, (5) because the authority believes that they’ve broken the law.
Retributive justice - Punishment, Deterrence, Rehabilitation: It is difficult to know when retribution was first used as a philosophy of justice, but the concept regularly recurs in many religions. There are mentions of it in several religious texts, including the Bible and the Qurʾān.
Oct 12, 2021 · And retributive justice, as Tsai says, is “the just allocation of punishment when there is wrongdoing.” However, she adds, “retributive justice is not revenge, which is an emotional reaction to a wrong that’s been done, and often violent.” In a high-functioning democracy, retributive justice appears as the normal legal process.
This sense of justice, again, is retributive, or corrective, justice (or correcting an injustice that has happened). There are two basic philosophical perspectives on retributive justice: utilitarianism (with an emphasis on deterrence) and retributivism (with an emphasis on desert).
retributivism—broadly defined as the view that punishment is justified and motivated by considerations of justice, rights, and desert, rather than by personal or societal consequences—holds a long-standing yet controversial position in legal and political philosophy.
