Are there any monarchies still going strong in Europe?
- Although many of Europe's monarchies no longer exist, there are several that are still going strong today — even if it is for purely symbolic reasons. Within those monarchies are a number of queens and queen consorts who serve as prominent social and cultural figures for the nations they represent.
Now the page has been modified to 'List of sovereign states and dependent territories in Europe' it's now incorrect to list these 2 entities since they're neither dependent territories nor sovereign states. Unless there's any problems, I'll remove these 2. --Richardeast 15:57, 20 August 2010 (UTC) You supported the inclusion of Svalbard before.
There is also a second meaning that allows us to speak of the four constituent "countries" of the UK, the Basque country, and probably many others that I can't think of right now. There is a clear semantic overlap: Such "countries" normally were sovereign states at some point in the past.
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Are there any monarchies still going strong in Europe?
Are there more than 197 countries in the world?
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How many queens are there in the world?
Are you sure this is the right template? This one is about sovereign states in Europe and not about whether or not the nation is a member of the United Nations. Sak ura Cart elet Talk 17:05, 19 October 2019 (UTC) IP is correct. Kosovo is already listed as a state with limited recognition.
Answer (1 of 3): Surprisingly, it may have been 1914, with a mere 57 sovereign states, some of them tiny. That’s not counting states that were overrun and later restored, such as Serbia.
Nov 02, 2018 · Although many of Europe's monarchies no longer exist, there are several that are still going strong today — even if it is for purely symbolic reasons. Within those monarchies are a number of queens and queen consorts who serve as prominent social and cultural figures for the nations they represent.
- Savanna Swain-Wilson
- Diversify Bank Risk
- Diversification in Practice
- The Formal Thinking
- What The Logic Shows
- Where Do We Go from Here?
It always seemed obvious to me that one good route here is to have banks diversify away from national risks. If Spanish banks would not hold Spanish bonds, if Portuguese banks would not hold Portuguese bonds and so forth, then a sovereign default or even just a decline in the prices of these bonds due to heightened default fears would not affect these banks directly. A similar argument can be made with respect to securities and loan portfolios that may be strongly affected by such default fears. A sovereign default would still lead to losses somewhere, but if these bonds are held as part of a larger portfolio by entities that are capable of bearing some market risk for the reward of the appropriate premium, it seems unlikely that the sovereign default fears will return with the same force, or that a sovereign default will trigger a financial meltdown, as has been feared in the past. Right now then is a good time indeed to urge the banks to diversify. Or perhaps they have diversified...
Unfortunately, diversification does not appear to have occurred. Research by Acharya and Steffen (2013) document, that “over time, there is an increase in 'home bias' – greater exposure of domestic banks to its sovereign’s bonds”. Figure 1 provides a simple summary. It is based on data from the European bank stress test in 2011 to show the fraction of sovereign debt held in the form of domestic sovereign debt, aggregating across the banks in the data sample in each country. Banks in Portugal, Spain and Italy hold more than 70% of their sovereign-bond portfolio in terms of domestic bonds. Put differently, rather than safeguarding the future of the European financial system, it has become more fragile. How could this have possibly happened? Why have policymakers not done more to cut this tragic link between home banks and sovereigns, in order to safeguard both? Figure 1. A number of reasons may come to mind. In my own paper (2013) I argue that it is the interplay between banks, their...
The formal model is highly stylised in order to focus attention on the core economic linkages: it has three periods; there are many countries, one of which is risky; countries issue sovereign debt in the first period to finance government spending; and there is a common central bank. 1. There are banks in all countries, who have some own equity and who accept deposits in the first period. They use these funds to purchase sovereign debt from safe as well as risky countries. 1. National regulators in the first period impose bounds on how many risky-country bonds their banks may purchase. For simplicity, I assume that banks are risk neutral. They choose the optimal portfolio in period 1, given the regulatory bounds as well as the option to default in period 3. Should a bank default in period 3, then its own government will bear a fraction of these losses, thus incentivising the regulators in period 1. 1. In the second period, depositors withdraw their funds. To satisfy these withdrawal...
With the theoretical analysis as well as numerical examples, I show two key results: 1. First, there can be equilibriums where countries sell all their debt to home banks, despite adding to the debt burden in default states;. This partially shifts any such losses to the common central bank. 1. Second, the haircut parameter applied by the ECB in the second period is immaterial for the outcome – it offers no protection against failures and defaults, given that sufficient liquidity is provided by the central bank in the second period. The reason is simple. What matters are the total resources needed in the second period. With a larger haircut, the banks simply post a larger number of bonds, but when all is said and done, nothing changes regarding the grand total.
Right now, yields are manageable. Countries can afford to tell their banks to diversify and to sell their domestic sovereign bond portfolio on the open market. If my story is right, regulators in Spain, Italy and Portugal won’t do it on their own. Some pressure from Germany, Austria and France would help, as would pressure from the ECB. Given these pressures, there would be no informational stigma attached to these sales either. It will be a good step forward in avoiding a return of the crisis, and to make its consequences less costly, should it return anyhow. The time to act is now.
Acharya, Viral V and Sascha Steffen (2013), “The 'Greatest' Carry Trade Ever? Understanding Eurozone Bank Risks”, CEPR Discussion Paper 9432. Reinhart, Carmen (2012), “The Return of Financial Repression”, CEPR Discussion Paper 8947, London. Sinn, Hans-Werner (2012), “Die Target-Falle: Gefahren für unser Geld und unsere Kinder”, Carl Hanser Verlag, Munich, Germany. Uhlig, Harald, “Sovereign Default Risk and Banks in a Monetary Union”, CEPR Discussion Paper 9606, German Economic Review, forthcoming.