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  1. Human terrain information is of no use to the unit unless it is integrated into the continuous planning and decision making processes. The team must be tied into all planning processes, including relevant working groups, assessment boards, etc. that can utilize human terrain data and socio-cultural awareness. Sources of Human Terrain Information

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  2. Oct 1, 2017 · 9 For an in-depth analysis of the dynamics of the teams, see Christopher J. Lamb, James Douglas Orton, Michael C. Davies, and Theodore F. Pikulsky, Human Terrain Teams: An Organizational Innovation for Sociocultural Knowledge in Irregular Warfare (Washington, DC: Institute of World Politics, 2013). This is the most in-depth, complete analysis ...

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  4. May 14, 2010 · Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) are five- to nine-person teams deployed by the Human Terrain System (HTS) to support field commanders by filling their cultural knowledge gap in the current operating environment and providing cultural interpretations of events occurring within their area of operations.

  5. Jul 1, 2015 · Even before all five teams had been deployed, early reactions from theater commanders were favorable. Within a year, the requirement for Human Terrain Teams mushroomed to 26 teams as the price tag surpassed $100 million annually. In the mad dash to fill positions, HTS hiring standards ranged from minimal to nonexistent.

  6. Mar 13, 2011 · There are currently 26 teams embedded at all echelons above brigade in both Iraq and Afghanistan, supporting both the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC). Human terrain teams (HTTs) consist of five to nine personnel deployed by the HTS to support field commanders.

  7. Human Terrain Analysis Teams (HTAT) Human Terrain and Analysis Teams provide support to echelons of the US Army that are above brigade or regimental level (e.g., division or regional command).

  8. human terrain system soldiers and civilians speak with Afghans during key leader engagement in southern Kandahar Province. number of teams. In 2008, the program had. 30 percent attrition rate during training that effectively cost $7 million18 and meant. training cycle had to be about 50 percent larger than absolute demand.

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