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  1. Human terrain information is of no use to the unit unless it is integrated into the continuous planning and decision making processes. The team must be tied into all planning processes, including relevant working groups, assessment boards, etc. that can utilize human terrain data and socio-cultural awareness. Sources of Human Terrain Information

  2. May 14, 2010 · Human Terrain System. 122 pages. September 2008. Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) are five- to nine-person teams deployed by the Human Terrain System (HTS) to support field commanders by filling their cultural knowledge gap in the current operating environment and providing cultural interpretations of events occurring within their area of operations.

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  4. ForuM | the Way Ahead for Human terrain teams The Army created Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) to provide combat forces in Afghanistan and Iraq with knowledge of the human terrain, or put differently, “sociocul - tural knowledge.” HTTs are small, cross-functional teams of specially trained military officers, research managers, and civilian

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  5. Jul 08, 2010 · Human Terrain Analysis Team helps 'Bulldogs' meet neighbors. By Pfc. Dave Peterson July 8, 2010. ... December 9, 2021 Workplace & Gender Relations Survey skipped in 2020, now open again;

  6. Mar 13, 2011 · The Human Terrain System (HTS) is a proof-of-concept program run by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The goal of HTS is to provide knowledge of the local population (the human terrain) to Army/military commanders to: • Assist them in understanding the people within their area of operations (AO).

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    Sociocultural Analysis.HTS’s raison d’etre was the mapping of the human terrain. In the non- or semi-permissive environments that characterized Iraq and Afghanistan, trained professionals could uniquely and quickly offer qualitative exploratory research to combat units. Reliable quantitative data were difficult to acquire (though it would be easier in a preconflict society). HTT analysis was built on a powerful research reachback capability, today preserved as the Global Cultural Knowledge Network at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The Phase Zero environment, more extensive baseline assessments, and local connections could potentially be established and social science could be used with a greater degree of reliability, so long as political and cultural sensitivities were observed. If operations move to more kinetic phases, reliably trained and vetted social scientists could provide insight into the rapidly changing dislocation that accompanies conflict. As designed, HTTs were to work as c...

    Commanders assessed their teams as successful if they brought understanding of the local environment, proved themselves by strong working relationships within the staff and with other enablers, and supported the brigade’s efforts with their unique skills sets. Despite considerable effort, HTS never established a comprehensive profile for what a successful “social scientist” looked like. Education and adaptability were known attributes, but alongside social scientists, those with a background in the humanities also exceled, so mission success was not necessarily limited by particular disciplines, such as anthropology. This had been suggested in the aforementioned 2008 West Point study, though it further complicated a troubled selection and assessment process. Clifton Green has argued recently that the HTS program turned itself around in 2012 and that it was a model program under the guidance and leadership of Colonel Sharon Hamilton. Until a more thorough organizational history is co...

    Sociocultural Information as an Intelligence Function.One stirring debate surrounding HTS concerned whether its function was intelligence or something else. HTS founders McFate and Fondacaro maintained that in order to be effective, HTS needed to forge ties within academia. They hoped that by focusing HTS products on unclassified material and widely disseminating them in an unclassified manner, such ties could be forged. In 2012, I argued for the gathering and collating of local and oral histories into an archive available to academics in a further effort to bridge the “academic/military divide,” as both McFate and I have termed it. But HTS was also a kind of intelligence function, reporting to TRADOC G2 (Intelligence). In 2010, its new director, Colonel Hamilton, had been deputy G2 at TRADOC and moved the organization in a direction more in line with G2 parameters. Almost all material generated was caveated For Official Use Only, with much of it being classified SECRET. As such, it...

    The Intelligence Community is already moving to capture some of the sociocultural analysis space, but this solution likely reduces sociocultural understanding to a subordinate position within a community where “red layer” concerns are paramount. Housing an HTS-like capability with SOF has some merit but has not been realized for undisclosed reasons. HTS housed with the State Department would likely run into budgetary constraints since State’s budget for research is so much smaller than that afforded by DOD. The Army seems to have adopted a hibernation strategy, preserving a core of HTS capability, in theory in preparation to surge or support combatant command demands should they arise. This strategy does not, however, provide significant preconflict analysis. But here is another possibility: hybridize the capability either by making it a part of the Army’s civil affairs organization or attaching small teams to work in Embassies, perhaps attached to Foreign Area Officers. HTS did not...

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