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1. plato.stanford.edu › entries › possible-worldsPossible Worlds - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

   plato.stanford.edu › entries › possible-worlds

   Oct 18, 2013 · Lewis finds a replacement for Ways in a principle of recombination whereby “patching together parts of different possible worlds yields another possible world” (1986, 87–88). The principle has two aspects.

   • Further Problems for Combinatorialism

     The totality of recombinations of these 'atoms' yields a set...

   • Problems With Abstractionism

     The proof of the left-to-right direction, however — which...

   • Lewis, David

     Lewis’s preferred interpretations are functions from...

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     Why Possible Worlds Exist!

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     Partially Examined Life #240: David Lewis on Possible Worlds and Language Games (Part One)

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3. en.wikipedia.org › wiki › Possible_worldPossible world - Wikipedia

   en.wikipedia.org › wiki › Possible_world

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   A possible world is a complete and consistent way the world is or could have been. Possible worlds are widely used as a formal device in logic, philosophy, and linguistics in order to provide a semantics for intensional and modal logic. Their metaphysical status has been a subject of controversy in philosophy, with modal realists such as David ...

4. en.wikipedia.org › wiki › Modal_realismModal realism - Wikipedia

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   Modal realism is the view propounded by philosopher David Lewis that all possible worlds are real in the same way as is the actual world: they are "of a kind with this world of ours." [1] It is based on four tenets: possible worlds exist, possible worlds are not different in kind from the actual world, possible worlds are irreducible entities ...

5. People also ask

   What does Lewis say about possible worlds?

   • After arguing that we are best off in all these areas of philosophy if we accept unactualised possibilities, Lewis spends the rest of chapter 1 saying what possible worlds are on his view. He isn’t yet arguing for this way of thinking about possible worlds; that will come in chapter 3.

   David Lewis - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

   plato.stanford.edu/entries/david-lewis/

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   Does Lewis resist impossibilia?

   • However, Lewis resists impossibilia, since he takes it as axiomatic that we can never assert a truth about an object by uttering a contradiction. Yet if Lewis’ worlds do not include impossible worlds, then his use of ‘world’ may indeed express a modal notion, meaning that circularity would again be a worry.

   Modal Metaphysics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

   iep.utm.edu/mod-meta/

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   Should Lewis admit impossible worlds?

   • Indeed, many have said that Lewis should admit impossible worlds anyway, for the same kind of indispensability reasons in favor of possible worlds. (Impossible worlds facilitate the semantics of, for example, “Some round squares are round” or “Crazy people believe that some round squares exist.”)

   Modal Metaphysics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

   iep.utm.edu/mod-meta/

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   Do possible worlds exist?

   • Possible worlds exist – they are just as real as our world. Possible worlds are the same sort of things as our world – they differ in content, not in kind. Possible worlds cannot be reduced to something more basic – they are irreducible entities in their own right. Actuality is indexical.

   Modal realism - Wikipedia

   en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modal_realism

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6. iep.utm.edu › mod-metaModal Metaphysics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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   Lewis (1973) responds with the idea of a counterpart: Even though you only occupy the actual world, you have counterparts in other possible worlds that determine the truth of ‘It is possible for me to be a dentist.’ In general, a counterpart will be a non-actual object that is “sufficiently similar” to you in certain worlds.

7. plato.stanford.edu › entries › lewis-metaphysicsDavid Lewis’s Metaphysics - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

   plato.stanford.edu › entries › lewis-metaphysics

   Jan 5, 2010 · Second, he offers an account of modality, his famous “realism” about possible worlds. Lewis, like many philosophers, takes talk of possibility and necessity to be best explicated as disguised quantification over possible worlds (and possible inhabitants thereof), and he was endlessly ingenious at showing how to use the resources provided by ...

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9. dash.harvard.edu › bitstream › handleDavid Lewis's Metaphysics - Harvard University

   dash.harvard.edu › bitstream › handle

   Second, he offers an account of modality, his famous “realism” about possible worlds. Lewis, like many philosophers, takes talk of possibility and necessity to be best explicated as disguised quantification over possible worlds (and possible inhab-itants thereof), and he was endlessly ingenious at showing how to use the resources