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Meta-ethics: addresses questions about first-order (normative) ethical judgments, e.g., about the nature of morality; the meaning of moral talk; whether morality is absolute or relative; whether moral judgments can be true or false (objective) or merely subjective, how we can have knowledge of moral truth. 2.
Discusses three forms of moral relativism—normative moral relativism, moral judgement relativism, and meta‐ethical relativism. After discussing objections to each view, it is shown that the objections can all be met and that all three versions of moral relativism are correct.
Moral judgment relativism holds that moral judgments make implicit reference to the speaker or some other person or to some group or to one or another set of moral standards, etc. Meta-ethical relativism says that conflicting moral judgments about a particular case can both be right. 1. NORMATIVE MORAL RELATIVISM.
- Gilbert Harman
- 1978
The first stage deals with ethical rela- tivism in its usual sense; each subsequent stage, involving the problem of giving good reasons in matters of ethics, presents a new type of ethical relativism for consideration.
First, it holds that descriptive, prescriptive, or meta-ethical aspects of prescriptive terms such as ‘right,’ ‘wrong,’ ‘ought,’ etc., (e.g., their use, legitimacy, or meaning) are relative to a moral view.
Meta-ethics is the area of philosophy in which thinkers explore the language and nature of moral discourse and its relations to other non-moral areas of life. In this introduction to the discipline written explicitly for novices, Leslie Allan.
People also ask
What is moral relativism?
What are the three types of moral relativism?
What is metaethical moral relativism (MMR)?
Does moral relativism affect moral confidence?
Unlike its normative cousin, meta-ethical MR is not a first-order view within ethical theory, but rather a second-order view about ethical theory. Thus meta-ethical MR typically makes claims about
