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      • Meta-Ethical Moral Relativism: There are no objective moral facts or properties, but moral facts and properties do exist in such a way as to depend on certain contextual parameters related to the individuals or groups forming moral judgments.
  1. Jan 23, 2007 · Metaethics is the attempt to understand the metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and psychological, presuppositions and commitments of moral thought, talk, and practice. As such, it counts within its domain a broad range of questions and puzzles, including: Is morality more a matter of taste than truth? Are moral standards culturally relative?

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    • Metaethics: Introduction. The prefix “meta” is derived from the Greek for “beyond”. Metaethics is therefore a form of study that is beyond the topics considered in normative or applied ethics.
    • The Value of Metaethics. A former colleague once suggested that Metaethics was entirely and frustratingly pointless — academia for academia’s sake, she thought.
    • Cognitivism versus Non-Cognitivism. Key to the successful study of Metaethics is understanding the various key terminological distinctions that make up the “metaethical map”.
    • Realism versus Anti-Realism. The second key fork in the road that separates metaethical theories is the choice between Moral Realism and Moral Anti-Realism (as with Cognitivism, the “Moral” prefix is assumed from hereon).
  3. Metaethics explores, for example, where moral values originate, what it means to say something is right or good, whether there are any objective moral facts, whether morality is (culturally) relative, and whether there is a psychological basis for moral practices and value judgements.

  4. Metaethics is a branch of analytic philosophy that explores the status, foundations, and scope of moral values, properties, and words. Whereas the fields of applied ethics and normative theory focus on what is moral, metaethics focuses on what morality itself is.

  5. Discusses three forms of moral relativismnormative moral relativism, moral judgement relativism, and meta‐ethical relativism. After discussing objections to each view, it is shown that the objections can all be met and that all three versions of moral relativism are correct.

  6. Meta-Ethical Moral Relativism: There are no objective moral facts or properties, but moral facts and properties do exist in such a way as to depend on certain contextual parameters related to the individuals or groups forming moral judgments.

  7. First, it holds that descriptive, prescriptive, or meta-ethical aspects of prescriptive terms such as ‘right,’ ‘wrong,’ ‘ought,’ etc., (e.g., their use, legitimacy, or meaning) are relative to a moral view.

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