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1 This is different for meta-ethical relativism: meta-ethical relativism is most often presented or defended in its extreme form, namely that all moral statements are relatively right or wrong if meta-ethical relativism is correct. For a discussion of this view, see Sinnott-Armstrong 2009. Varying versions of moral relativism 97 123
psychology that is connected to meta-ethical moral relativism (hereafter just “moral relativism”). Indeed, the purpose of this chapter is to focus on two main topics: (i) The psychology of folk moral judgments, and whether such judgments show signs of a (implicit) commitment to moral relativism.
Moreover, psychological research that has specifically focused on meta-ethics, has not addressed questions concerning ethical objectivism. Instead, it has focused on the distinction between ethical universalism and ethical relativism – i.e., whether individ-uals treat their ethical beliefs as applying to all people, and all cultures (Nichols &
Meta-ethics: addresses questions about first-order (normative) ethical judgments, e.g., about the nature of morality; the meaning of moral talk; whether morality is absolute or relative; whether moral judgments can be true or false (objective) or merely subjective, how we can have knowledge of moral truth. 2.
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Normative ethics and applied ethics are covered in separate chapters. Each field is distinguished by a different level of inquiry and analysis. Metaethics focuses on moral reasoning and foundational questions that explore the assumptions related to moral beliefs and practice.
desire to punish or compete, play a distorting role in generating -ethical judgments (see, e.g., meta Mackie, 1977, p. 43; Fisher et al., 2016; Rose & Nichols, forthcoming). In this paper, we want to pursue a more optimistic possibility, that ’s beliefs about relativism and universalism are partly people
(9) (Meta-ethical MR ⇒ Normative MR).22 clearly does not hold either, although there might be a strong inclination to adopt normative MR if one thought that moral frameworks are mere individual or social constructions. Finally and perhaps most interestingly, it is a mistake to think that: (10) (Meta-ethical MR ⇒ Descriptive MR).